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THE ECONOMICS OF THE NEXT ADJUSTMENT
K. E. BOULDINC, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
I am going to begin with some propositions, which
may seem too familiar and obvious to be worth stating. Neverthe-
less, it is the obscurities at the heart of the obvious which cause the
most trouble.
The first proposition, then, is that underemployment of resources,
undercapacity use of an economic system, or, more plainly if less
exactly, depression, is the result of an inability of the system to
"absorb" or dispose of as much output as will be produced at "full"
or optimum capacity. There are only two ways in which output
can be absorbed. It can be consumed, in the literal sense of. the
word—that is,it can be destroyed and cease to exist—or it can
be held willingly. "Willing holding" implies that at the existing
structure and level of prices people can be found who are willing
to hold the present stock of goods of all kinds. If, therefore, at
capacity or optimum 1outputthe institutions and the desires of the
members of the system together do not suffice to absorb it all, there
will be "unwilling accumulation."
Actual accumulation in a period is always equal to the total
output of the period less its consumption, for whatever has been
produced must either have been consumed or is still around some-
where. Put into the form
Accumulation =production—consumption
and expressed in value terms, this identity is seen as the famous
savings-equals-investnlent identity of Keynes' General The
value of accumulation is one important meaning of investment, the
value of production is one important meaning of national income,
and income minus consumption is an important meaning of sav-
ing.
"Optimum" output is likely to be less than output at physical capacity be-
cause of the desire for leisure and nonmarket activities. The vagueness of this
concept in no sense detracts from its importance.
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Flexibility of the Price System
The critical question now is what happens when actual accumu-
lation is greater than "desired" accumulation, that is, when there are
"unwanted" stocks of goods. The answer depends largely on the
flexibility of the price system. If the prices of these goods are flexi-
ble, the appearance of unwanted stocks (at the existing price level)
will drive down the prices to the point where people willing to
hold the goods can be found. If all prices are flexible, the appear-
ance of unwanted stqcks will cause a general deflation of the price
level to the point where holders can be found. This in essence is
the famous "Pigou effect." It assumes of course that the stock of
money has a degree of inflexibility in it, so that a decline in the
general price level will not reduce the money stock proportionally.
As prices fall, therefore, the value of the money stock rises relative
to the value of the stock of goods or real assets; hence the willingness
of people to hold physical assets should increase. The prospect of
a future rise in price will of course make people even more willing
to hold goods. It is thus clear that the Pigou effect can operate
merely by increasing the community's willingness to invest—that is,
to hold stocks of goods that otherwise it would not wish to hold.
Deflation also may operate on the level of the consumption func-
tion. It may do this partly by a simple liquidity effect, in that the
rise in value of household balances may induce households to con-
sume more at given levels of real income. The most important effect,
however, is likely to be through the redistribution of income. De-
flation redistributes income toward the recipients of fixed money
incomes—rentiers, pensioners, etc.—and away from profit makers.
Insofar as the rentiers are low savers 'and the profit makers are high
savers, the redistribution of income itself will raise the level of the
consumption function. This assumes, of course, that the marginal
propensity to consume is higher among those who gain by the de-
flation than among those who lose by it. If the reverse is the case—
a situation which cannot be ruled out as impossible—this effect of
deflation will be perverse and will lead a fall rather than
a rise 'in the consumption function.
Price flexibility may also lead to dynamic instabilities of the
system, familiar to most economists. The "Pigou effect" depends
on low, not on falling, prices. A falling price level in itself tends
have a perverse effect. It discourages investment, for when
prices are falling it is more profitable to hold assets in the form of
cash and bonds, which are appreciating in value, than in the form
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of goods, which are declining. It is true that the losses of deflation
are in part fictitious, because of an almost unavoidable defect
of the accounting system which records a decline in the dollar
value of assets as a loss in net worth, even though the purchasing
power of these assets in terms of other things may not have changed.
Even fictitious losses affect behavior, however, and the losses are
not wholly fictitious in that the purchasing power of cash and
bonds does increase more rapidly than that of real goods, so that
those who hold cash and bonds do better than those who hold•
goods, conduct business, and give employment. A falling price
level may even have an adverse effect on consumption, if people re-
gard it as a sign to wait until prices have reached bottom. This
merely reflects the impact on households of the fact that with a
falling price level "idle money" bears a real rate of interest in terms
of purchasing power.
In additionS to these weighty theoretical objections to flexible
prices as a cure for underemployment, there is of course the very
practical objection that general price flexibility is not practicable
in ahighlyorganized economy, as least by any institutions which
can easily be visualized. Under deflationary pressure those who can
hold up the prices of what they sell, whether they are manufac-
turers, fanners, or laborers, do so, believing, not unreasonably, that
even if the pie is smaller their share will be larger. One certainly
cannot visualize in otir society the destruction of the labor move-
ment, the abolition of agricultural price support, and the ruthless
ant itrust activity or even the "counter speculation" (in Lerner's
language) that would be necessary to make prices flexible in pri-
vate markets. We can perhaps visualize a price control in reverse,
beating down the price-wage structure by setting legal maximums
well below existing levels. This may not be absurd, but it is cer-
tainly visionary, and of dubious value even if it could be achieved.
We must therefore reconcile ourselves to a substantial degree
of price inflexibility,especially downward. If, however, prices
cannot be lowered, the result of unwanted accumulations is an im-
mediate cutback in output, and therefore in employment. In the case
of a single firm, unwanted accumulations of inventory usually in-
volve unwanted decumulations of liquid assets, for unsold goods
and depleted money balances tend to go hand in hand. The usual
response to this situation of firms selling in an imperfect market
is to cut back output and lay off men, this being the only practica-
ble way of restoring their liquidity and diminishing their inven-
tory. The decline in output, employment, and income, however,
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diminishes consumption, leading to further unwanted accumula-
lions, and the economy will slide back along the total absorption
curve until the decline in output overtakes the decline in consump-
tion and the decline in the willingness to accumulate, and tempo-
rary equilibrium is reached at levels of output low enough to elimi-
nate involuntary accumulation. This melancholy situation can be
eliminated only through spontaneous upward movements of the
consumption and investment functions brought about, for instance,
by a decline in stockpiles or the wearing out of fixed capital, or
through a deliberate increase in absorption performed by or engi-
neered by government.
Positions of Equilibrium
By the of an. economy I mean the extent to
which a given change in the position of the total absorption curve
changes the position of equilibrium. Equilibrium in this connec-
tion implies having no unwanted accumulations. Precariousness as
defined above is a matter of comparative statics—a comparison of
two positions of equilibrium with different parameters for the
determining functions. There may also be dynamic precariousness
if the dynamics of the system are perverse, in the sense that a
movement toward equilibrium itself will change the parameters of
the determining equations in such a way as to move the equilibrium
still farther away from the actual position of the system. Thus a dog
is precarious in the sense that the appearance of a rabbit makes him
want to be where the rabbit is. This is comparative statics. This
system, however, is also dynamically precarious—the act of chasing
the rabbit generally removes the rabbit still farther from the dog's
old position of equilibrium.
A simple output system is statically precarious if the propensity
to absorb is close to 1, that is, if a change in output produces an al-
most equal change in consumption plus willing accumulation. It
is dynamically precarious if the adjustments forced upon the sys-
tem by unwanted accumulations (or decumulations), whether in
the form of price changes or output changes, themselves lower (or
raise) the level of the total absorption function. These concepts
are illustrated in Figure 1. OY measures output or real income,
OA real absorption. N1P1 is a total absorption curve which inter-
sects the 45° line OP1 at a "high level" equilibrium with output at
0M1. If the absorption curve is close to the 45° slope, a relatively

















Ko 1<1STRUCTURE AND STABILITY
equilibrium output to 0M2. Thisis"static precariousness." Now
suppose that the movement from M1 to M2, however contrived, it-
self lowers the absorption curve to N3P3 : output will go on declining
past the static equilibrium point M2 to M3, or to where this dy-
namic movement peters out. Once the movement has stopped, the
curve moves back to N2P2, say, and an upward movement pushes
output up to M2 and beyond till the movement peters out again,
from which point the cycle repeats itself. Dynamic precariousness
clearly results in a cyclical movement, which may be damped, ex-
plosive, or of stable amplitude depending on parameters of the
system. It is most likely in practice to be damped.
This simple model shows clearly the difference between the
problem of cycles, which are due to dynamic precariousness, and
the problem of the "general equilibrium" of the economy in
its static state. The static equilibrium may be one of stagnation
below full with unemployment relieved only by dynamic
movements above the equilibrium position, or it may be a "pres-
sure economy" with constant inflationary pressure relieved only
by downward dynamic movements.
I have dwelt at some length on this simplest of all models of a
macroeconomic system, familiar as it is, because it illustrates so well
the dilemmas of policy that face us at the present time. It is not
always realized that the problem of moderating the amplitude of
dynamic fluctuations may be quite different from the problem of
shifting the position of static equilibrium of the system and may
require quite different kinds of measures. If we are suffering from
excessive dynamic instability, the remedies would seem tolie
along two possible lines. The first would be to damp the cycle
itself by identifying and correcting those factors in the system
which lead to perverse dynamic reactions. The "100 per cent re-
serve" plan, aimed at preventing a shrinkage of bank deposits in
deflation of prices, would be a remedy of this type. The second line
of attack on dynamic instability would be to introduce into the
system counterfiuctuations which are designed to offset the per-
verse dynamic movements of the absorption function. Monetary
policy, reduction of interest rates when investment lags, adjustable
tax plans, commodity reserve plans, public works cycles—these are
all examples of counterfiuctuations. The difficulty of counterfluctiia-
tion policy is that it must be timed properly and be of the right
intensity; otherwise, as Friedman has shown,2 it may actually in-
tensify the amplitude of the cycle.




If, however, the problem is not so much one of dynamic insta-
bility as of stagnation, or undercapacity equilibrium, measures with
different ends in view are necessary, measures to be conceived not
as countercycical but as directed toward shifting the "level" of
the cycle—i.e. the range within which the cyclical forces move the
essential variables. This is not to say, of course, that measures which
may be useful in combating dynamic instability may not also be
useful in shifting the level of the cycle itself, but in principle the
two problems must be kept distinct. The long war and postwar
prosperity has made the secular stagnation doctrines seem very out
of date. Nevertheless, it is possible that the long period of almost
continuous full employment from 1941 to the present is a reflection
of the size of the war economy rather than of any sufficient long-
run forces in the civilian economy, and it is worth glancing at the
stagnation thesis again in case there should be an outbreak of peace.
The stagnation thesis is simply that the level of investment (i.e.
the willingness to accumulate) is inversely related in any given
state of techniques to the amount previously accumulated, and that
hence the process of accumulation itself destroys further oppor-
tunities for accumulation. Opportunities are, in a dynamic culture,
constantly recreated by discoveries and inventions; but even this
source of dynamism must eventually wear itself out, and the
shadow of the stationary state falls across the march of events.
The notion of a stationary state was, of course, familiar to Adam
Smith and Ricardo; in their view, however, there would still be
full employment in the stationary state because consumption would
rise to fill the gap left by the decline in accumulation, and when the
stationary state was reached consumption would be equal to pro-
duction and there would be no further accumulation or saving. In
the Maithus-Keynes-Hansen version, the consumption function fails
to rise sufficiently to take care of the decline in investment, and the
stationary state is reached only at the cost of unemployment and
undercapacity output.
The stagnation thesis has been confused by the failure to dis-
tinguish clearly between the "real" and the monetary aspects of
the models—an unfortunate characteristic of Keynesian theory. If
the model is formulated clearly in "real" terms, it becomes appar-
ent that the stagnationists have left out of account a very important
variable in the consumption function: the stock of capital itself.
If we think of. consumption as the destruction of capital, it includes
depreciation, and we can suppose that there is a certain "fixed con-
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sumption" which is independent of income but which depends on
the size and on the durability of the stock of real capita]. The
larger the capital stock and the shorter its average period of pro-
duction (if I may use an old-fashioned but useful concept) the
larger will this "fixed consumption" item be. Thus the basic assump-
tIon on which, for instance, the gloom of the Harrodian system is
founded—that consumption is a constant proportion of income—
seems to me quite indefensible.
These principles are illustrated in Figure 2, where the axes have
the same meaning as in Figure 1. We suppose C0L0 to be a con-
sumption function at time t0. 0C0 is the "fixed consumption," as-
sumed to be dependent on the capital This is the amount of
consumption even at zero income. Now let us suppose that the
"ideal" or full employment output is OK0. If this output is to be
stable, an amount L0M0 must willingly be added to total capital.
This addition to total capital, however, increas6s the capacity of
the system, which in the next period is OK1. The ratio LQMO/KOK1
is the accelerator coefficient required for continuous full employ-
ment, or Harrod's "capital requirement." If the consumption func-
tion does not change in the period ti.,theamount of investment re-
quired to give full employment is L1M1. If, however, as a result
of the rise in the stock of capital the consumption function rises
from C0L0 to C1H1, the amount of investment required for full
employment in the period t1 is only H1M1, not L1M1. The question
of stagnation in the stationary state then depends on whether the
rise in "fixed consumption" with increasing capital stock will be
enough to compensate for the decline in willing accumulation (in-
vestment).
Let m (= R1L1/LORI)be the marginal propensity to consume;
c the "capital coefficient," L0M0/L0R1; and fthefixed consumption
coefficient, L1H1/LOR1. Then
H1M1 =L0M0+ L0R1 —L1H1—R1L1
whence
It should be observed that thevolumeof "fixed consumption" depends on
the stock of human capital as well as the stock of material capital. Thus ina
societyin which a high level of skill and education is maintained, a considerable
portion of the output consists of the replacement of the depreciation of the hu-
man population through death and aging by child rearing and education. Here
again the volume of fixed consumption depends on the period of production; if
the average expectation of life is high, less will have to be expended in
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where e is the "warranted rate of growth" of investment—i.e. the
rate of growth necessary to maintain stable full employment. In the
Harrod system, of course, f= 0and 1 —m= s, the "average
propensity to save," as Harrod assumes a consumption function
like 0S1S2. In Harrod's system, therefore, there is practically no
chance for e to be zero or negative. In the extended model, how-
ever, it is quite possible for f+m to be greater than 1, in which
case a declining level of investment will still yield full employment.
The value of fdependson the average length of life of additions
to the stock of capital. If these additions are short-lived, fwillbe
large. In view of the problem of the structure of the populations of
goods we cannot assume a simple relation between the length of
life and f,butin an equilibrium population the relationship would
be f=1/L, where L is the average length of life of additions to
the stock of capital. Thus if the additions to the stock of capital
have a life expectancy of five years, the addition to consumption in
the form of depreciation, reflected eventually in maintenance ex-
penditures, will be one-fifth of the total investment.4
The weakness of these aggregative models as a means of identify-
ing the strategic factors in antidepression policy is their neglect of
the more intricate structural problems of the economy. Capital and
income, in real terms, are not homogeneous aggregates, but highly
heterogeneous aggregates of large numbers of different commodities
—vectors that cannot be reduced to a single linear dimension with-
out doing serious violence to reality. This is important for policy
questions because difficulties that arise as a result of strains in the
structure and composition of the aggregates may not be suitably
resolved by methods, such as tax or government expenditure
changes, that operate on the economy as a whole, or at least on its
various sectors more uniformly than the structural situation may
require.
ing the population. The output involved in population growth should properly
be regarded as investment, but a considerable proportion of this can also be
regarded as independent of income.
4Recentstudies indicate that there has been a sharp downward trend in the
capital/output ratio in recent years. According to Daniel Creamer (Capital and
Output Trends in Manufacturing Industries, 1880—1948, National Bureau of
Economic Research, Occasional Paper 41, 1954) the ratio of capital to value
added in manufacturing (in 1929 prices) fellfrom 2.555 in 1929 to 1.655 in 1948.
A recent (unpublished) calculation by L. R. Klein indicates a similar decline for
the whole economy from around 3.5 before 1929 to about 2.5 in 1950. If this
can also be regarded as indicating a similar fall in the marginal capital-output
ratio, there must have been a considerable increase in the consumption coefficient
f, which will make the task of maintaining full employment with constant or
even declining rates of investment much easier.
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Possible Structural Difficulties
An example will clarify the point. I have recently made a pro-
jection (Kykios, August 1955) of automobile population and produc-
tion on various highly simplified assumptions for the next fifteen
years. On almost any assumptions there seems to be trouble ahead
for the automobile industry on a strictly structural basis, because
we are now approaching the period when the non-existent cars of
the war years would have been in those age groups with the high-
est "death rates." Because of this serious distortion in the age
structure of automobiles it seems certain that if automobile pro-
duction is to be maintained between now and 1960 at present levels,
the total population of cars will have to rise much more rapidly
than it has been rising. If the population merely continues to rise
at present rates the annual production will fall from over 5 to a
little over 4 million by 1958—a serious prospect not only for the
automobile industry, but for the whole American economy. There
may be similar structural difficulties ahead in other consumer
durables, for similar reasons, but unfortunately we know nothing
about the age composition of consumer capital beyond the happy
accident of the information provided by automobile registrations.
There may be similar structural difficulties ahead in residential
housing, as a result of a decline in the number of new families be-
cause of the low birth rates of the thirties and the inevitable cessa-
tion of the decline in the age of marriage.
There is also a strong possibility of serious structural difficulties
in agriculture, always the sick sector of a progressive economy. In
part, overproduction in agriculture is a result of foolish policies in
the past, but it is also a recurrent structural difficulty in a society
like ours, simply because the amount of rural migration necessary
to maintain a proper balance between agricultural and industrial
output seems to require almost a condition of inflation and hyper-
employment in industry. When industrial employment is "normal"
the job opportunities in the cities are not plentiful or attractive
enough to create the necessary rural exodus, and agricultural sur-
pluses begin to• pile up. Agricultural surpluses, however, especially
in a free market, have a strongly depressive effect on the price level
of agricultural commodities, and even on the price level in general.
I am in the middle of a study of the relation of commodity stocks to
prices which suggests—in spite of the limited information available
—that there is a strong inverse relation between commodity stocks
and the price level, as we should expect from market theory. There-
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fore, a disproportionality in the structure of industry involving an
excessive amount of resources in the raw material industries and a
deficiency in services and processing near the consumer end in-
creases "unwanted" accumulations and thereby sets off a process
either of deflation of prices or of contraction of output, or both.
This structural difficulty may have nothing to do with any defici-
ency in money supply or even in aggregate demand; there may be
"shortages" of services at the same time that there are surpluses of
commodities. Nevertheless, it creates a strong deflationary force in
the economy, which is almost certain to cause trouble. We have
managed to avoid this particular difficulty in the war and postwar
years largely by subsidized exports, first through lend-lease and
later through the Marshall Plan. This policy is not well adapted,
however, to a more "normal" world when the deficiencies in the
domestic production of other countries have been remedied.
Information and Effector Channels
Getting a little closer now to the policy issues facing us, we
must raise the difficult and largely unexplored problem of the na-
ture of the economic information required to operate a successful
antidepression policy. In their theoretical constructs economists
have been curiously indifferent to the information concept and to
learning processes. This perhaps is because of the long predominance
of the perfect competition model, where the price system itself
provides, in simple and accessible form, all the information neces-
sary to describe economic behavior. As soon, however, as we take
imperfect markets into account, and as soon as we begin talking
about stabilization policy on the part of government, we must face
the questions of what information is necessary for appropriate ac-
tion and how this information is obtained. In stabilization policy
especially, what we are proposing is the setting up of a servomecha-
nism for the "governing" of certain critical economic variables.
Such an apparatus always involves devising information channels
from the system to the "executive" or controller, and channels of
effect from the controller to the system. If systems of this kind are
set up too clumsily, they may even generate wider fluctuations, es-
pecially if there are serious lags in the effector apparatus or in the
information system.
Several problems involved here have received far too little at-
tention. One is the problem of "signal detection"— How do we dis-
tinguish a signal from "noise," i.e. purely random, or at least non-STRUCTURE AND STABILITY
significant, events, changes, or positions of our sensitive variables?
All economic variables are subject to fluctuations; the question is
what changes are significant, in the sense that they require action,
and what changes are not significant and can be regarded as "ran-
dom." Recent work on the theory of signal detection has shown that
the criterion for selection of doubtful signals depends on the penal-
ties for false alarms and missed signals and the rewards for cor-
rect perception of either the presence or the absence of a signal.
Thus if the penalties for false alarms (saying there is a depression
when in fact there are only random fluctuations) are light, and the
penalties for missed signals (saying there is no depression when in
fact there is) are heavy, the criterion for detection will be set at a
point where there is a likelihood of a considerable number of false
alarms but very few misses. This is a possible explanation for the
tendency of all advanced societies to inflation in the absence of
strong taboos against it in the form of artificial false alarm penalties,
such as those involved in the maintenance of a gold standard.
The behavior of a servomechanism depends in part on the time
lags involved in the information and effector channels, and these
may be serious in the case of the economic system. If information
regarding the state of the economy only reaches the controller with,
say, a six months' time lag, and if his decision to act on this in-
formation only takes effect in another six months, the danger that
his action will augment instead of diminish cycles is a real one.
Fortunately, much has been done in recent years to speed up the
transmission of information. We should be unwise, however, to
assume that this problem is solved, particularly where action in-
volves cumbersome governmental and Congressional procedure.
Perhaps the most serious of all the problems involved in the
control of depressions, however, is that of the appropriateness of
the "effectors." If the action of the controller affects many variables,
and especially if it affects them with a time lag, the attempt to
stabilize one variable or set of variables may result in the destabiliza-
tion of others. In any antidepression program, therefore, it is
sary to look at the structural problems as well as the aggregative
measures of the economy, with a view to improving the specificity
of the action taken. Thus suppose unemployment develops in the
automobile and perhaps a few other industries as a result of the
structural difficulties peculiar to these industries outlined above.
This will be reflected in a rise in the over-all unemployment figures.
A rise of this kind, however, concentrated in a few industries, con-
stitutes a very different kind of "signal" from a rise uniformly spread
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over the economy. In recent years economists have rightly criticized
a "piecemeal" approach to problems of economic stability, as re-
flected, say, in agricultural policy, and have emphasized the im-
portance of looking at the economy as a whole. The ease with which
the macroeconomic variables can be manipulated has reinforced
this tendency. Nevertheless, it is now time, perhaps, to point out
that although the economy is a whole it also consists of parts, and
that even though we must look at the effects of policy as a whole,
this does not mean that actions taken should be only those which
spread their influence uniformly over the whole economy.
There is a case, therefore, for "structural policies," directed at
those parts of the economy where difficulties are arising. This is the
case for specific agricultural policies directed toward the removal
or prevention of surpluses. It is a little odd, though no doubt ex-
plicable on political lines, that agriculture is almost the only sec-
tor for which specific policies are suggested. There is a good case,
for instance, if my projections of automobile population are correct,
for helping the automobile industry over the expected trough by
deliberately withdrawing automobiles from the road, either by more
stringent licensing provisions or by a program of the purchase and
scrapping of obsolete vehicles. The case for public works in a
trough of the building cycle is of course a familiar one and is part
of this same argument for "structural" policy. There is no absolute
reason why tax policy and even monetary policy should not be
"structural" in the sense of having an uneven incidence in differ-
ent sectors of the economy. Traditions of equity in fiscal and mone-
tary affairs, however, are strong—and rightly so—and make it dif-
ficult to impose frankly discriminatory taxes or loan policies.
All this in a sense is merely introductory to the main theme of
this conference. I shall be glad, however, to leave the practical
application to hornier statistical hands than mine, and I shall end
with a brief recapitulation of what I conceive the present problem
to be.
Seeing the Whole and the Parts
We are now in the thirteenth year of virtually full employment,
beginning with 1941. In the attainment of this happy state, how-
ever, we have endured one major and one minor war, an arms race,
and an inflation. The critical question for our society is whether
this association between war and full employment is an accident
or a necessity. If the latter, then I think we can write our society
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off as a failure, with all its accomplishments. War is not only an
outrageously high price to pay for full employment, but is a most
unreliable means of payment, for wars are created much more by
political than by economic breakdowns, and nobody in his senses
is going to go to war in order to get full employment. Fortunately,
I think it can be shown that the connection between war and full
employment is nOt a necessary one, though it is by no means acci-
dental. What gives us full employment is not war itself, but the
expansion in government absorption which it coupled with
inflationary finance and price-wage stickiness or controi. It is clear,
therefore, that one recipe for full employment is a sure thing—large
government expenditures, a budget deficit, and suppressed inflation
—and that this remedy is good no matter what the government ex-
penditure is on: an $80 billion budget is likely to yield full employ-
ment and inflation whether it is spent on the means of death or on
the means of life.
This remedy, however, is not acceptable, for good and proper
reasons. It is still too high a price to pay for full employment, even
though it is a much more agreeable price than war. Our instructions
are therefore to think again and come up with peacetime full em-
ployment at cheaper rates, with less government and no inflation.
I am not altogether sure that the article we want is in the window
with this price tag on it. Nevertheless, it is worth asking for; it may
be hidden in the back of the store.
The broad outlines of the problem are clear. If government ab-
sorption declines, and if private domestic investment declines, there
must be a corresponding increase in household absorption or in net
foreign investment, if capacity output is to be maintained. The de-
tails, however, are difficult. We have first to inquire whether there
are "legitimate" expansions in peacetime government activity that
can take the place of military expenditures. A moderately affirma-
tive answer can surely, be given to this question, especially if state
and local governments are taken into account. One of the contribut-
ing factors to the Great Depression was that the decline in state and
local government activity more than compensated for the expansion
in federal activity. There seems to be a real weakness in our over-
all governmental structure at this point, and we should explore
methods of expanding state and local government expenditures
which are consistent with a federal system. Certainly the economic
needs are there—in roads, in education, in the beautification of
towns and cities, in slum clearance, and so on. It would be tragic if
the federal nature of our Constitution imposed quite unnecessary
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financial barriers to the satisfaction of these legitimate needs in a
time of threatened depression.
The center of the prob1em, however, lies around the level of the
consumption function and the trend in this level. If we may look
at the bright side of things for a moment, there are reasons to sup-
pose that the consumption function is higher than in the thread-
bare thirties and is likely to remain so. One reason is the change
in the age distribution of the population. In the thirties an abnor-
mally large proportion of the population was of working age. This
meant a low consumption function, for it is those in the middle
years who produce more than they consume and those at the ex-
tremes, both children and old people, who consume more than they
produce. It also meant that the labor force itself was abnormally
large, so that even had the proportion of the population employed
been normal, for an undistorted age distribution, there would still
have been a gap between the labor force and the employed force,
creating a social problem of unemployment. Now, on the other
hand, we are in a period where the rise in the proportions both
of the aged and of children may lead us to a situation with a rela-
tively smaller proportion of people in the labor force and in middle
life, so that we shall have high consumption functions and a low
labor force.
The introduction of social security, insurance of bank deposit's,
agricultural income-maintenance programs, and other legacies of
the depression also give us a certain amount of "built-in flexibility"
that we did not have in the thirties, which should serve to protect
us against some of the worst aspects of "perverse dynamics." Never-
theless, we cannot assume any necessarily automatic adjustment.
An economy as "precarious" or sensitive as ours can go bad fast if
conditions favor a general decline in the absorption functions, as
they did for instance in the 1937—1938 episode. The situation may
be all the more dangerous, potentially, if the perverse dynamic re-
actions have a "threshold" so that hope suddenly turns to despair
on a large scale at some critical point on the downward path.
It is easy to think of drastic and wholesale remedies for an ob-
vious crisis—wholesale of taxation, budget deficits, pub-
lic works, and so on. What is difficult is to design a policy that will
interpret small signals correctly and will be sensitive to the struc-
tural dislocations of the economy. Thus if we seek to use a general
remission of taxation to counteract a depression in automobiles
caused by age-structure factors, the result may be inflation in the
economy as a whole without much effect on employment in the
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automobile industry. Many of these difficulties arise because eco-
nomic signals are significant not by themselves but only in conjunc-
tion with others. Thus a decline in agricultural prices may mean
that adjustments are necessary in the proportion of resources go-
ing into the production of the storable crops and not enough into
other things, even within agriculture. Or it may mean that the
banking system is failing to provide increments of money supply
sufficient to take care of increasing population and income. Or it
may be the result of a pure speculative movement of a "self-
justifying" nature. Each of these conditions may require different
policies.
Thus the time may now be ripe for a new generation of econo-
mists to turn their attention to the structure of the economic ag-
gregates, with a view both to elucidating what subaggregates are
essential parts of the economic information system and to collecting
information about them. The pre-Keynesian type of business cycle
theory can be justly accused of never seeing the wood for the
trees. Keynesian theory is open to the opposite accusation—that of
never seeing the trees for the wood. In this generation we may well
set ourselves the task of seeing both wood and trees, returning,
with the Keynesian vision of the whole firmly in mind, to the re-
newed study of the parts in the light of their contribution to, and
significance for, the general system.
COMMENT
GEBHAIWCOLM,Chief Economist, National Planning Association
Without judging the usefulness of Boulding's basic concepts for
economic analysis in general, it seems to me that they are not suit-
able for business cycle analysis. Boulding asserts that economic the-
ory has overlooked an important fact by not counting depreciation,
"which is independent of income but which depends on the size and
on the durability of the stock of real capital," as consumption. He
does not explicitly recognize, however, that this "fixed consump-
tion" is a kind of consumption which in itself does not affect the
level of economic activity and that of employment. It affects these
only to the extent that actual replacement of worn-out plant and
equipment takes place, and replacement is not a "fixed" element of
demand.
I agree with Boulding's main point, that we are facing a double
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precariousness, namely, a dynamic instability and the possibility of
an undercapacity equilibrium—or, we may say, a cyclical problem
and a structural one.
There are, of course, interrelations between the cyclical and
structural problems. Because of structural, and in part institutional,
changes in our economy, the nature of the cyclical processes. has
changed. Other papers in this conference discuss a number of the
structural and institutional changes that have made the American
economy more shock-resistant. But I agree with Boulding that we
have no assurance of stability. Some reduction in incomes and
spending may still cause further reductions in income and spending.
Also, an undercapacity equilibrium—that is, a "sidewise" movement
of the economy—if continued for some time, is likely to result in a
curtailment in investments for expansion and thus may cause a
cyclical disequilibrium.
The initial reasons for the recent downturn and the possibility
of a. "sidewise" movement below the full employment level are likely
to lie in structural changes in the economy now taking place. One
of the structural changes is that national security expenditures have
recently been leveling off and that, under present programs, they
are expected to be further reduced. The problem that we are fac-
ing can be expressed in simple quantitative form as follows: At the
present time, economic activity is moving at an annual rate of about
$15 billion below the full employment level. Because of the in-
crease in productive capacity and in the labor force the full em-
ployment level itself increases by $10 to 15 billion over the period
of a year. Thus a year from now a full employment level will be
$25 to 30 billion above the present level of activity. Furthermore, if
national security expenditures should be reduced in accord with
present plans by about $5billionover a year, it follows that private
demand and demand for government nondefense services should
increase by at least $30 billion during the same time to permit full
use of available resources.
In this needed expansion of private demand, consumer demand
will probably have to rise more than investment demand. During
the three-year period of the build-up in national defense, the ratio
of consumer demand to total demand was reduced (even though
the absolute level of consumer expenditures continued to rise). If
national security expenditures should level off or contract, consumer
expenditures would have to rise not only in proportion with the
needed rise in total demand but, in addition, enough to increase
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their ratio to total demand. This is a problem of structural adjust-
ment which, if not taken care of, may lead to a cyclical down-
swing.
"The economics of the next adjustment" in my judgment centers
around the question as to how, through the forces of the market
supported if necessary by government policies, this rise in active
demand and these structural áhanges can be made.
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